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The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be 
groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, 
and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative 
consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many 
scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically 
regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to 
skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that skepticism is 
implausible because it is impractical. In particular, skepticism is implausible because 




Anti-skeptical views come in many forms. There is the heroic quest to refute the skeptics on 
their own turf. There is the attempt to show that skepticism is self-defeating. There is the 
argument that skeptics are merely redefining the word ‘knows’ and imposing artificially high 
standards. There is the pragmatic view that skepticism is unlivable: the skeptic will be 
unable to act, or she will be unable to live a normal life.1 
 
This last objection, according to Allan Hazlett, is “probably the most instinctive and common 
and historically important objection to skepticism” (2014: 21). Put more broadly, the charge 
is that skepticism is, in some sense, impractical. Let’s call proponents of this view 
“pragmatic anti-skeptics”.  
 
Pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are frequently dismissed. The consequences of 
skepticism might be bad or impractical for us, but this fact is believed to have little, if any, 
bearing on the truth of skepticism. We find this idea in Hazlett’s book, A Critical Introduction 
to Skepticism:  
 
The Cartesian skeptic alleges, for example, that you do not know that you have hands. That it 
would be impractical to believe that you do not know that you have hands is orthogonal to the 
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question of whether you know that you have hands. And so it is orthogonal to Cartesian 
skepticism. The defender of an argument is committed to the truth of its conclusion, not its 
practicality. (Hazlett 2014: 94)  
 
Many epistemologists agree. As Diego Machuca (2015: 482) says, “it is plainly a non sequitur 
to argue that the excruciating practical and emotional effects of skepticism entail that it is 
false or that it ought not to be considered as a valid philosophical alternative.” In his 
criticism of Crispin Wright’s entitlement-strategic way with skepticism, Duncan Pritchard 
says:  
 
This is, at best, merely a pragmatic resolution of the skeptical paradox, since it simply notes that 
accepting the skeptical conclusion would lead us to absurdity and intellectual stasis and then 
argues on this basis that we must reject it and therefore accept the legitimacy of our ultimately 
groundless believing. That…is not, however, an epistemic reason for thinking that such beliefs are 
true, but merely a pragmatic consideration which counts in favor of our proceeding as if they are 
true. Non-skepticism is thus defended on the grounds that it is the practical alternative, but we 
knew that already. Despite the well-advertised claims to contrary, then, this…presents us with no 
epistemic response to the skeptic at all. (Pritchard 2005: 207) 
 
The general complaint is this: we all recognize that there are good practical reasons to avoid 
skepticism, but this provides us with no good epistemic reasons to dismiss the skeptic. The 
impractical consequences of skepticism are, allegedly, irrelevant to its truth.  
 
For the most part, I agree that a theory is not rendered implausible simply because 
accepting it would be inconvenient, impractical, or bad for us in some way. Nevertheless, I 
think there is an important sense in which the impractical consequences of skepticism are 
relevant to evaluating its truth. In fact, I hope to convince you that skepticism is implausible 
because it is impractical (in a particular way). If I am right, then at least one version of 
pragmatic anti-skepticism is a reasonable philosophical view.   
 
2. The New Apraxia Objection 
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One of the most famous and historically important objections to skepticism is the problem 
of how to live with skepticism. This is called the “problem of apraxia”. Historically, the 
problem of apraxia was understood as the problem of how to live as a skeptic, that is, as 
someone who suspends judgment in belief. This objection was targeted primarily at the 
ancient Pyrrhonists, who recommended that we suspend judgment to avoid error. A well-
known worry for this view is that it amounts to a kind of intellectual suicide. The formation 
of beliefs is a basic aspect of human life, and it is unclear whether we can live an ordinary 
life without belief. Indeed, belief formation may be necessary for our survival, in which case 
skepticism would be more than intellectual suicide.   
 
The merits of the apraxia objection need not concern us. I am primarily interested in 
contemporary (i.e. post-Cartesian) skepticism, not ancient pyrrhonism. Contemporary 
skeptics rarely argue that we should suspend judgment in belief. Rather, their target is 
knowledge (or justification).2  
 
Contemporary skepticism comes in at least two forms. First, the skeptic may argue that 
knowledge requires one to meet an incredibly high epistemic standard. In particular, 
knowledge requires the highest possible degree of justification (evidence, probability, 
warrant, reliability); viz., justification that guarantees the truth of the claim believed.3 
Second, the skeptic may not speak of “standards” for knowledge but instead argue that we 
simply have no evidence or justification to support the belief that things are the way they 
appear (as opposed to some radically skeptical way). In both cases, the skeptic tends to 
argue that we know nothing, or almost nothing, about the world around us because we 
cannot rule out the possibility that we are systematically deceived. For example, I do not 
know that I have hands because I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat artificially 
stimulated to have these impressions. A key difference between these views, however, is 
that the second type of skeptic is also skeptical about justified belief.  
 
In what follows, I will focus primarily on skepticism about knowledge. This view is widely 
discussed in contemporary epistemology.4 I think my pragmatic account can be adapted to 
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provide an argument against skepticism about justification, but I will set aside this view for 
ease of exposition (although I will briefly discuss it in section 7.4). 
 
Unlike the Pyrrhonists, contemporary skeptics do not recommend the suspension of 
judgment; thus, they will not face the problem of being unable to act without belief. As 
Descartes observes, the skeptics of his day did not extend their doubts to “the actions of 
life.” Why, then, have I brought up the apraxia objection? It is because the question of how 
to live with skepticism, even in its contemporary form, is still an important one for 
philosophers to consider. In this paper, I want to outline a substantially modified version of 
the apraxia objection. I will not argue that skepticism is unlivable because we cannot act 
without belief (the traditional apraxia objection). Rather, I will argue that skepticism is 
implausible because it goes against the very purpose of epistemic evaluation. I call this the 
new apraxia objection.  
 
3. The Practical Role(s) of Knowledge 
An increasingly popular idea in epistemology is that an adequate theory of knowledge 
should fit plausible assumptions about the point or purposes of the concept of knowledge. 
We may regard this as a “functionalist turn” in epistemology. The idea, put roughly, is that 
we have a practice of epistemic evaluation to serve certain purposes; thus, our strategy 
should be to use the role (or roles) of the concept of knowledge as an adequacy constraint 
on the theory of knowledge. We find this idea in Edward Craig’s groundbreaking work, 
Knowledge and the State of Nature, from which many epistemologists now draw 
inspiration.5 Instead of analyzing knowledge into necessary and sufficient conditions, Craig 
recommends that we investigate the concept of knowledge by asking, first, what it does for 
us (what its role is) and then, second, what a concept having that role would look like (what 
conditions would govern its application). The general thought is that we come to 
understand the nature and value of knowledge by asking about the practical function of the 
concept of knowledge.  
 
This contrasts with the usual focus in epistemology. Scholars investigating the nature of 
knowledge and the plausibility of skepticism have tended to focus on whether knowledge 
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(or ‘knows’) requires agents to satisfy the skeptic’s demanding standards. Largely absent 
from this debate, however, has been any reflection on why knowledge (or ‘knows’) would 
come equipped with such standards. I want to reconsider the merits of skepticism in light of 
this question. I will argue that skepticism is unable to underwrite the primary roles that our 
knowledge concept plays in epistemic evaluation. This is because skepticism has no 
connection with the practical circumstances that explain why we speak of knowing in the 
first place. On these grounds, I will argue that skepticism should be regarded as an 
implausible theory of knowledge.  
 
But first I must say more about what exactly the function of epistemic evaluation is 
supposed to be. If knowledge is valuable because it serves an important practical role in 
human life, just what is this role (or what are these roles)? I will explore the four most 
popular accounts and I will use these to explain why skepticism ought to be rejected on 
pragmatic grounds.  
 
4. The Informant-Flagging Function 
According to Craig (1990), the primary function of the concept of knowledge is to identify 
reliable informants. Elsewhere I have provided a book-length defense of this idea (see 
Hannon 2019). For the sake of brevity, I won’t recapitulate the details of this view here. 
Rather, I will outline a small number of highly plausible and easily stated assumptions that 
support Craig’s hypothesis.  
 
The first assumption is that human beings need true beliefs about their environment to 
successfully guide their actions.6 The second assumption, which derives from the first, is 
that humans require sources of information that will lead to true beliefs. The third 
assumption, which is strongly supported by recent work in the epistemology of testimony, is 
that most of our information about the world comes to us from the testimony of others 
(Lackey and Sosa 2006). If you want to find out whether p, then asking someone reliable is 
often the easiest and most efficient way to do so. The fourth assumption is that informants 
will typically vary in terms of their reliability. On almost any issue, some people are more 
likely than others to be right. Consequently, we all have an interest in evaluating the 
   
 
   
 
6 
epistemic quality of our informants. We want to distinguish the people on whom we should 
rely from those we shouldn’t rely on. According to Craig, our practice of epistemic 
evaluation is a response to this need. More specifically, the concept of knowledge is used as 
a marker for sufficiently reliable informants.  
 
This disarmingly simple hypothesis explains why we tend to value knowers: they help us 
acquire reliable information. It also explains why the concept of knowledge is valuable: it 
plays an important—perhaps indispensable—role in our conceptual repertoire; in particular, 
it allows us to identify reliable sources of information. In this way, our practice of epistemic 
evaluation contributes to human survival, cooperation, and prosperity.  
 
Does this functionalist story facilitate a pragmatic response to the skeptic? I believe it does.   
 
Inquirers want reliable information on which to base their beliefs and actions. Following 
David Henderson (2009), let’s calls this “actionable information”. We each want actionable 
information to help satisfy our other needs and interest. However, our desire for 
information extends beyond our own immediate context. Although we often want 
information “here and now”, it is also in our collective interest to pool information and 
share it with members of our community. Thus, we tend to assess the reliability of 
informants not just for ourselves but for others, too, since this allows us to store reliable 
information while it is available—without knowing when, why, or under what circumstances 
it may be needed. This requires each of us to evaluate the adequacy of informants for 
people and purposes outside our immediate context. In short, we need to share information 
and identify good informants in general.7 When we attribute knowledge to someone, we 
are thereby certifying the agent’s epistemic position as good enough for the community at 
large.  
 
But how good is “good enough”?  
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This is a difficult theoretical problem.8 Thankfully, we needn’t get into the details of 
determining precisely where this threshold for knowledge is set. For our purposes, it will 
suffice to acknowledge that this standard cannot be too low nor can it be too high.  
 
If it were too easy to qualify as a knower, then our concept of knowledge couldn’t play the 
role of identifying individuals who are reliable enough for a wide range of potential 
inquirers. As Craig puts it:  
 
a practice develops of setting the standard very high, so that whatever turns, for others, on 
getting the truth about p, we need not fear reproach if they follow our recommendation… In 
recommending an informant to you I am indeed implying that the likelihood of his being right is 
as great as your concerns require. (1990: 94) 
 
In other words, the informant-flagging function puts upward pressure on the standards 
required to qualify as a knower. To count as a knower, an informant must be “someone with 
a very high degree of reliability, someone who is very likely to be right” (Craig 1990: 91). 
 
But the standard cannot be too high, either. Why not? Because demanding infallibility from 
fallible humans would undermine the very point of having a concept of knowledge. On 
Craig’s view, we engage in epistemic evaluation to flag informants who can provide us with 
reliable information, but if we were to insist on the highest level of justification (i.e. the 
level demanded by the skeptic), then we would exclude a vast number of inquirers who are 
perfectly reliable for everyday purposes.9  
 
An example will illustrate this idea. A Student and a Birdwatcher are both looking at a 
goldfinch.10 Each attempts to form beliefs on the basis of their experience. The Student has 
very limited knowledge and is unable to rule out the possibility that the bird is a 
woodpecker. The Birdwatcher, by contrast, can easily tell the difference between a 
woodpecker and a goldfinch. In fact, the Birdwatcher often wins birdwatching contests 
because he is so highly skilled at distinguishing various birds. Nevertheless, the Student and 
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the Birdwatcher are both unable to tell whether they have been recently envatted and are 
merely looking at a vat-image of a goldfinch.  
 
Although both the Student and the Birdwatcher are unable to rule out radical skeptical 
scenarios, the Birdwatcher is still more discriminating than the Student. This illustrates that 
we may still draw distinctions that we tend to care about even though neither the Student 
nor the Birdwatcher can eliminate skeptical worries. As Jonathan Schaffer says, their 
discriminatory range differs and “one’s epistemic standing is based on one’s discriminatory 
range” (2004: 152).   
 
The skeptic will deny that the Birdwatcher knows that the animal is a goldfinch. But why 
would knowledge require us to meet the skeptic’s demands? To insist upon skeptical 
requirements would exclude a vast number of informants who are perfectly suitable for the 
purposes of many, perhaps most, inquirers. By withholding a knowledge ascription, we 
would suggest to others that these perfectly reliable informants do not have sufficiently 
good information on which others can base their beliefs and actions. Yet there is a clear 
benefit to treating individuals as good informants if they are likely enough to be correct for 
everyday purposes: we do not always require our informants to have the highest quality 
epistemic position. Indeed, almost no inquirer is concerned, in daily life, with finding an 
informant who can distinguish radical skeptical scenarios from non-skeptical scenarios. 
Presumably this is because no such people exist. We are all epistemically limited in this way, 
so there can be no practical advantage in seeking out informants who are able to do the 
impossible.  
 
Here’s another example. Suppose I am inquiring into the whereabouts of my cat, Garfield. It 
might be that neither you nor I (nor anyone else) can rule out the possibility that we are 
brains in vats, but your epistemic position might still be better than mine in various ways. 
Perhaps you have already thoroughly checked the kitchen while I have not (or at least the 
nearest envatted equivalent of doing this). Or perhaps my wife told you that Garfield is at 
the vet. These are distinctions that we care about, but they get lost if too many possibilities 
are selected as ones we must rule out.  
   
 




This pragmatic approach helps shed light on why skepticism is implausible. The concept of 
knowledge is rooted in the social-epistemological need for pooling and sharing information, 
which generates a need to identify informants who can provide us with reliable information. 
The skeptical result runs against this approach because it would frustrate our communal 
epistemic practices. To deny knowledge to a potential informant would suggest that they 
are not in a strong enough epistemic position to appropriately contribute to the stock of 
information on which others can draw for various projects. The problem with skeptical 
standards is that they restrict us to recommending informants who are infallible, but in 
doing so we can recommend no informants at all (or hardly any). We have no use for such a 
concept.  
 
So far I have followed Craig by arguing that the concept of knowledge is rooted in our 
fundamental need to identify reliable informants. But why think knowledge serves only this 
role?  
 
Elsewhere I have argued that the informant-flagging function is the primary function of our 
knowledge concept, but I will not argue for that view here. Rather, I will briefly consider 
three additional accounts of the purpose of knowledge and I will argue that skepticism is 
also incompatible with each of these hypotheses.  
 
5. The Inquiry-Stopping Function  
Another popular view is that inquiry appropriately ends at knowledge. As Jonathan Kvanvig 
(2009: 344) writes, “When you conceive of yourself as knowing a given claim, you will be 
puzzled by any counsel to investigate the matter further.” For example, we may stop 
inquiring into whether the bank is open tomorrow when we come to know that it is open 
tomorrow (DeRose 2009). Knowledge settles the question.11  
 
We can motivate this view in the following way. We start with the assumption that, as 
inquirers, we seek reliable information on which to base our actions. However, the process 
of inquiry is potentially open-ended. For example, what does it take to know that David 
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Foster Wallace is the author of Infinite Jest? Would it suffice to ask someone reliable? Must I 
see the book myself? Must I confirm with the publisher that the author’s name was 
correctly printed on the book? Must I investigate whether the novel was actually 
ghostwritten? Must I know that I am not a brain in a vat? Inquiry can be thought of as a 
process of ruling out various possibilities; however, it is almost always possible to continue 
one’s inquiry (logical possibilities are endless). Thus, we need a point at which people can 
reasonably terminate inquiry. According to Kvanvig, this stopping point is cognitively 
valuable because it satisfies one of the platitudes about the functional roles of knowledge: it 
signals the point of legitimate inquiry closure (2009: 344). 
 
Let’s assume that we need to signal when inquiry has gone on long enough. How long is 
that? It is when one has knowledge, according to this view. But what is required for 
knowledge? By reflecting on the practical role of epistemic evaluation, we again get crucial 
leverage against the skeptic.  
 
The claim that knowledge licenses the closure of inquiry makes sense only if we are 
fallibilists. If knowledge demanded too much, inquiry would go on endlessly. After all, 
inquiry has no natural stopping point because there are always further conceivable but 
uneliminated possibilities of error. We therefore need an explanation for why inquiry would 
demand less than infallibility (or perfect reliability, certainty, the ability to rule out brains in 
vats, etc.). The most plausible explanation, to my mind, is that continuing to inquire beyond 
a certain point would be impractical: it would commit us to paying higher informational 
costs that are not worth the lessened risk of being wrong. Indeed, the skeptic seems to 
demand that we satisfy conditions that are impossible for any fallible creature to satisfy. But 
the circumstances of daily life do not demand that our chances of being wrong are 
absolutely zero (as argued in the previous section). Thus, the best way to make sense of the 
idea that inquiry appropriately ends at knowledge is by embracing fallibilism and denying 
skepticism.  
 
6. Knowledge, Assertion, and Practical Reasoning 
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Let’s briefly consider two more ways in which the impractical consequences of skepticism 
undermine its plausibility. I will then discuss several objections to my pragmatic anti-
skeptical view.   
 
Suppose, first, that you are in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p if (and 
perhaps only if) you know that p.12 If skepticism were true, then assertions could almost 
never be epistemically warranted (at least not without some probability qualification). But 
such a result seems obviously intolerable from a practical standpoint because we often have 
urgent needs for communicating information. Thus, it makes more sense to suppose that 
knowledge is the norm of assertion only if skepticism is false. Likewise, assume that you are 
in a good enough epistemic position to rely on p in practical reasoning if (and perhaps only 
if) you know that p.13 If skepticism were true, then your justification would almost never 
provide a sufficient basis for practical reasoning. This is problematic because we are still 
faced with the unavoidable need to act; thus, there is practical pressure to think knowledge 
is the relevant norm only if skepticism is false. 
 
I am not claiming that the knowledge norms are logically inconsistent with skepticism. We 
could in principle accept the knowledge norms but abstain from engaging in any assertions 
and practical reasoning.14 My claim is that the intuitive connections between knowledge, 
assertion, and practical reasoning are practically incoherent (see Hawthorne 2004: 133–4). 
In other words, it is a matter of practical necessity that we do need to assert and reason 
practically in our everyday life in order to survive and pursue our aims. Skepticism would 
render these activities impossible unless we constantly violated the epistemic norms 
governing these practices. 
 
In summary, the skeptic invites us to abandon the very purpose (or purposes) of our 
practice of epistemic evaluation. By taking a pragmatist view, it becomes difficult to see 
how the skeptical demand for infallibility would serve fallible creatures in everyday life. 
When the requirements for knowledge are too demanding, it frustrates our communal 
epistemic practices and is antithetical to the point of epistemic evaluation. Pragmatism can 
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help us resist skepticism by explaining why there is downward pressure on the epistemic 
standards for knowledge.   
 
I doubt that what I have said completely rules out the possibility of skepticism. After all, 
there is nothing logically inconsistent with the skeptic’s conclusion. Perhaps a better way to 
frame my argument, then, is in terms of a dilemma for the skeptic.15 Either the purpose of 
knowledge is such that it rules out skepticism, or else knowledge is itself a useless and 
uninteresting concept. So even if skepticism were true, our inability to identify a practical 
function for knowledge would make it unclear why we should care much about the absence 
of knowledge.  
 
7. Objections and Replies 
I have been arguing that skepticism is incompatible with the function of epistemic 
evaluation. However, one might criticize my argument in several ways. Below I consider 
some objections to my view.  
 
7.1. Are the Functions of Knowledge That I Have Identified the Right Ones?  
I have provided four explanations for why skepticism is incompatible with the practical role 
of knowledge: the informant-flagging function, the inquiry-stopping function, the need for 
an epistemic norm governing warranted assertion, and the need for an epistemic norm 
governing practical reasoning. But these hypotheses are not uncontroversial; objections 
have been made against each of them. Moreover, this list may not be exhaustive. Beyond 
the roles I have identified, scholars have claimed that knowledge is connected to activities 
like: distinguishing blameworthy and blameless behavior (Beebe 2012), providing assurance 
(Lawlor 2013), countering doubts (Rysiew 2001), and indicating that one is certain (BonJour 
2010). This plurality may lead us to wonder whether some additional role (or roles) will 
better fit with skepticism than fallibilism.  
 
Replies 
The four functional accounts I have discussed are, of course, not the only ones available—
nor are they free from criticism. However, they are the most popular and widely discussed 
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accounts of the functional role of knowledge. Thus, any other hypothesis I might have 
considered would have been even more controversial. Further, I have elsewhere explored a 
broader range of hypotheses about the function of epistemic evaluation, and I have argued 
that all these hypotheses tend to support fallibilism over infallibilism.16 In addition, it is a 
weak objection to simply point out there might be a hypothesis about the function of 
knowledge that better fits with skepticism. Surely this claim needs to be argued for. Finally, 
any skeptic-friendly hypothesis would have to be more compelling than the considerations I 
have marshalled against skepticism; otherwise my own view would still be more plausible 
on balance.  
 
7.2. Skeptical Standards Are Just a Brute Fact about Knowledge 
I have argued that skepticism is implausible because it contradicts the purpose of epistemic 
evaluation. In response, one might claim it is simply a brute fact about knowledge that it 
requires us to meet the skeptic’s standards. Robert Pasnau makes this point: “If anyone 
wonders why the standards for knowledge must be so high, the response is just that this is 
what the word means” (2015: 260). Although Pasnau refers to the meaning of the word 




The “brute fact view” is unsatisfying for three reasons.  
 
First, it simply disregards what I take to be an important criterion for a theory of knowledge, 
namely, that it provides a plausible explanation for why knowledge is equipped with the 
features that it has. There is something deeply unsatisfying with an account that leaves this 
question unanswered. Indeed, Panayot Butchvarov considers this to be the most 
characteristic symptom of the inadequacy of traditional accounts of knowledge (1970: 25–
6). My own view, in contrast, provides several explanations for why knowledge requires 
fallible rather than infallible justification.  
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Second, the “brute fact view” about the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’ is highly 
implausible. It seems to assume that our words come to us pre-programmed with specific 
meanings, as though they were delivered from on high, rather than designed to serve some 
purpose(s) for the people who use them. Further, the brute fact view about knowledge 
(rather than the word ‘knowledge’) seems to implicitly presume that knowledge is a natural 
kind. This is a highly contentious view. While Hilary Kornblith (2002) has carefully articulated 
this idea, few epistemologists are convinced that knowledge is a natural kind.17 A more 
plausible view, I think, is that knowledge is a social or artifactual kind; it is not something we 
find in the world, like rocks and water, but rather is something we impose on it.18 
Accordingly, the identity conditions for knowledge are intertwined with human interests 
and intentions. This aligns with the functionalist account of knowledge that I have been 
defending in this paper. 
 
Third, even if knowledge were a natural kind, this idea still faces a problem. As Hume, 
Nietzsche, and other genealogically-inclined philosophers make clear, we take our use of 
concepts to have a contingent human history. Thus, we still need an explanation for why we 
would ever have invented or adopted a particular concept in recognizably naturalistic terms. 
So even if knowledge were a natural kind, it would still be hard to explain why humans have 
adopted and employed it as we have if we could not assign any practical value to it. 
 
7.3. All I Have Shown Is That It Is Useful to Say That People Have Knowledge 
The skeptic may resist my argument by drawing a distinction between the conditions that 
must be satisfied to appropriately say that somebody has knowledge, on the one hand, and 
the true conditions for knowledge, on the other. As Paul Grice (1989) made clear, all the 
conditions for warranted assertion can be met even though what is said is not literally true. 
With this familiar distinction in hand, the skeptic may argue as follows: the practical factors 
that I have mentioned are what determine the conditions for appropriately ascribing 
knowledge, but knowledge itself is actually subject to skeptical requirements.  
 
We find this argument in Barry Stroud’s book, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. 
He maintains that it is perfectly appropriate to credit people with knowledge in daily life, 
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but he also says there really is no such thing as knowledge (or at least a lot less than we 
suppose). Peter Unger (1975) defends a similar view. He argues that knowledge is an 
‘absolute term’ in the sense that it requires us to meet the highest possible standard: 
absolute certainty. This leads to skepticism. But Unger nevertheless maintains that it is 
perfectly acceptable to say that we know things in the context of ordinary life.  
 
The skeptic may supplement this view with a pragmatic explanation for the assertability of 
knowledge. This enables her to explain our intuitions about the acceptability of ordinary 
knowledge ascriptions. For example, the skeptic may claim that it is unnecessarily fussy to 
insist that a belief isn’t knowledge when the believer is close enough to meeting the ideal 
standard. Alternatively, it could be that people reasonably regard their justification for a 
belief as conclusive when in fact deeper philosophical reflection reveals it is not. Or perhaps 
one who claims to know that p is really making a conditional or elliptical claim, namely: one 
knows p assuming that some alternative possibilities which are not worth taking seriously 
are indeed false.19 These are just a few examples. I mention them simply to illustrate that 
the skeptic has several ways to explain why we routinely (but falsely) speak of knowing. 
 
Stroud provides a closely related explanation. He says that “practical exigency” prevents us 
from applying skeptical standards in real-life situations:  
 
There is a single conception of knowledge at work both in everyday life and in the philosophical 
investigation of human knowledge, but that conception operates in everyday life under the 
constraints of social practice and the exigencies of action, co-operation and communication. The 
practical social purposes served by our assertions and claims to know things in everyday life 
explain why we are normally satisfied with less than what, with detachment, we can be brought 
to acknowledge are the full conditions of knowledge. From the detached point of view—when 
only the question of whether we know is at issue—our interests and assertions in everyday life 
are seen as restricted in certain ways. (Stroud 1984: 71) 
 
In other words, we recognize that for practical purposes we cannot entertain skeptical 
challenges, since we have urgent needs for communicating information and it would be too 
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cumbersome to couch virtually all our assertions in probabilistic terms. We therefore ignore 
the skeptical requirements for knowledge in daily life.  
 
Supposing this line of reasoning is correct, skepticism would no longer risk practical or 
intellectual disaster, for it would leave untouched our ordinary practice of epistemic 
evaluation. On this view, we are pragmatically warranted in continuing to attribute 
knowledge to others and ourselves, even though nobody, strictly speaking, knows anything. 
I will call this view “pragmatic skepticism”.20 The pragmatic skeptic claims that our ordinary 
knowledge claims are for the most part appropriate and reasonable. In other words, our 
ordinary practice of epistemic evaluation is perfectly in order and, thus, skepticism has no 
impractical consequences. 
 
Pragmatic skepticism creates a special problem for my view (which I’ve dubbed pragmatic 
anti-skepticism). Both the pragmatic skeptic and the pragmatic anti-skeptic appeal to 
practical considerations to avoid the potentially disastrous consequences of skepticism; 
however, the pragmatic skeptic uses practical considerations to explain the plausibility of 
skepticism, while the pragmatic anti-skeptic uses these same considerations to explain the 
implausibility of skepticism. Does this mean that practical factors cannot help to adjudicate 
the dispute between the skeptics and their rivals?   
 
Replies 
Pragmatic skepticism faces three initial objections. First, it runs the risk of idleness. Berislav 
Marušić (2010) raises this objection. He writes, “If a skeptic grants that we should continue 
claiming that we know things, engaging in enquiries, and relying on the results of science, 
then it seems that she hasn’t taken the skeptical conclusion seriously” (2010: 61). I am 
inclined to agree. One has not genuinely become a skeptic if one is happy to leave our 
practice of epistemic evaluation totally untouched by the truth of skepticism. Second, if 
skepticism were not worrying or had no negative consequences, it would be surprising why 
so many scholars have dedicated their efforts to replying to skeptical challenges. Third, one 
could respond to the pragmatic skeptic by appealing to semantic ascent. We could argue 
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that the extension of ‘know’ must be non-skeptical in order to serve its role. In this case, 
one’s investigation would be about the use of the word ‘knows’ and not about knowledge.21  
 
But I want to make a different, and I think deeper, objection to pragmatic skepticism. I will 
argue that this view is not well motivated because it fails to explain the plausibility of 
skeptical standards for knowledge. Let me elaborate.  
 
The pragmatic skeptic says the requirements we must satisfy to merit a knowledge 
ascription are very different from the standards required for knowledge—we often satisfy 
the former, but we rarely, if ever, satisfy the latter. The pragmatic skeptic also recognizes 
the important practical role that knowledge ascriptions play in ordinary life. However, these 
practical considerations are said to have no bearing on whether one knows. This creates a 
puzzle. Why would it be that speaking of ‘knowing’ plays vital roles in everyday life while the 
actual standards for knowledge are radically out of touch with these roles? In other words, 
what point would there be in a knowledge concept that is equipped with skeptical 
standards? The pragmatic anti-skeptic has a plausible story to tell about why our knowledge 
concept is shaped a particular way. The skeptic, in contrast, has no such story. Skepticism 
leaves unexplained why the assertability conditions for ‘know’ would be sensitive to 
practical exigencies while the truth conditions for knowledge would be isolated from, and 
unaffected by, such pragmatic considerations. Why would the conditions for knowing be 
isolated from the utility of this practice? In short, why keep two sets of books?  
 
Consider the following argument by Laurence BonJour. He admits that meeting the skeptic’s 
demands is “obviously intolerable from a practical standpoint” (2010: 74). Yet he also claims 
that knowledge is the norm governing assertion and practical reasoning. This view is 
perplexing. On the one hand, BonJour recognizes that there is “practical pressure in the 
direction of reasoning from and acting upon claims whose justification does not fully meet 
the standard for knowledge” (2010: 75). On the other hand, he admits that assertions can 
almost never properly be made and practical reasoning would be paralyzed, given skeptical 
requirements. BonJour thus concludes that we must, for practical purposes, make 
unqualified assertions and act upon claims even when “this is not really (fully) warranted by 
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the epistemic situation” (2010: 74). But if the relevant epistemic norm would paralyze 
action and render almost all assertions improper, why should we think that the norm 
governing these activities is knowledge (in the skeptic’s sense)? What explanation could be 
given for—and what purpose could possibly be served by—having an epistemic norm to 
govern these highly practical activities when that very same norm threatens to render these 
activities impossible? It makes sense to regard knowledge as the relevant norm only if we 
adopt a fallibilist conception of knowledge. 
 
The general complaint against pragmatic skepticism is that it leaves mysterious why 
knowledge would be equipped with skeptical requirements in the first place. The pragmatic 
skeptic is able to provide an explanation for why we ordinarily say that people know things 
(thereby making an important advance on less sophisticated forms of skepticism), but their 
view has no connection to any plausible hypothesis about the point of epistemic 
assessment. As suggested earlier, a plausible theory of knowledge must be true to facts 
about the purpose for which this epistemically evaluative practice exists. Thus, what’s 
wrong with skepticism is not that it lacks fidelity to our ordinary practice of knowledge 
attribution (the pragmatic skeptic can explain that away); the problem, rather, is that it lacks 
fidelity to the very purpose (or purposes) of speaking of knowing. 
 
I now want to consider a related, but importantly different, objection to my view. Instead of 
providing a pragmatic explanation for why we speak of knowing, the skeptic might instead 
argue that skepticism itself can be grounded in practical factors. I consider this idea below.  
 
7.4. Knowledge as a Regulative Ideal 
Perhaps some practical considerations do favor skepticism over fallibilism. This is different 
from the view outlined in the previous section. According to the previous view, practical 
factors explain why it is reasonable or appropriate to attribute knowledge to people. I 
complained that this view gives no plausible story for why knowledge (or our concept of 
knowledge) would be equipped with skeptical standards. But perhaps there are practical 
factors that push in the direction of skepticism.  
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What practical favors might these be? A promising idea is that infallibility provides us with a 
regulative ideal. According to this view, the concept of knowledge characterizes an ideal 
cognitive state or situation. We will rarely achieve this ideal, but it nonetheless provides us 
with a useful goal to which we should aspire. In this way, knowledge is not very different 
from other commonly accepted ideals, such as moral or aesthetic ideals. For example, no 
one will ever be perfectly moral, but we should still try to be as moral as possible. Similarly, 
we will never fully escape our own biases, but we should try to be unbiased. These 
regulative ideals describe states of affairs that are highly valuable and desirable, even 
though they are rarely, if ever, achieved. Still, we may enlist these ideals as benchmarks 
worth aiming at.  
 
I will call the defender of this view the “practical ideals skeptic”. This skeptic will agree that 
infallible knowledge represents an unachievable standard, but she will also argue that 
unachievable standards can play important practical roles in human life. Thus, the fact that 
we know nothing or almost nothing does not undermine the practical role of (infallible) 
knowledge—or so the objection goes.  
 
Replies 
I will not take issue with the claim that epistemic ideals are important and worth pursuing. 
This seems uncontroversial. What is controversial, however, is whether the practical value 
of epistemic ideals lends any support to skepticism. Below I provide two reasons to doubt 
this view. First, the practical value of epistemic ideals presupposes that we can approach or 
approximate the relevant ideal, but this assumption runs against the radical skeptic’s 
argument. Second, the fact that it is useful to aspire towards some cognitive ideal gives us 
little reason to think the relevant ideal is knowledge (or knowing).  
 
Let's suppose that knowledge is an ideal cognitive state that provides us with a benchmark 
worth aspiring to. To have practical value, this cognitive ideal must be approachable to 
some degree. If we were unable to make any progress towards our ideal goal, then aspiring 
to it would surely be pointless. For example, if it were impossible for humans to diminish 
their biases to any extent, then striving to be unbiased would have no practical value. 
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Similarly, if it were impossible for humans to morally better themselves to any degree, then 
striving for moral perfection would be pointless. Thus, “practical ideals skepticism” must 
assume that our cognitive ideals are approachable.  
 
But many skeptics reject this assumption.  
 
Hilary Kornblith (2000) draws a useful distinction between the “full-blooded skeptic” and 
the “high-standards skeptic”. The full-blooded skeptic claims that “we are no more justified 
in believing that there is an external world than that there isn’t,” and that we “have no 
degree of justification whatever for [our] claims about the external world” (2000: 26). In 
contrast, the high-standards skeptic is perfectly willing to grant there are differences in 
degree of justification that people have for their various beliefs; she simply denies that we 
ever reach some very high standard required for knowledge.  
 
With this distinction in hand, it becomes clear that “practical ideals skepticism” is a version 
of high-standards skepticism. The practical ideals skeptic assumes we are able to 
approximate or approach our epistemic ideals, whereas the full-blooded skeptic denies the 
possibility of such epistemic success. Is this a problem for the practical ideals skeptic?  
 
According to many philosophers, high-standards skepticism is not a very interesting or 
threatening philosophical position. As soon as we admit that some beliefs are epistemically 
better than others, skepticism loses its teeth. As Pasnau puts it, “If that is all that is at stake 
in the quarrel over skepticism, then who cares?” (2015: 260). Similarly, Kornblith claims that 
high-standards skepticism is “a wholly trivial and uninteresting position” (2000: 27). Wright 
also finds high-standards skepticism to be toothless: 
 
We can live with the concession that we do not, strictly, know some of the things we believed 
ourselves to know, provided we can retain the thought that we are fully justified in accepting 
them...What is not tolerable is the thesis that…we never actually attain to genuinely justified 
opinion: that no real distinction corresponds to that which we are accustomed to draw between 
grounded and ungrounded beliefs. (1991: 88)  
   
 




Thus, appealing to the practical role of epistemic ideals might drain skepticism of its 
significance. Practical ideals skepticism is incompatible with full-blooded skepticism, and yet 
it is the full-blooded skeptic who is allegedly making “a historically important and 
philosophically interesting claim” (Kornblith 2000: 27). According to Wright (1991), it is a 
constraint on responding to skepticism that we do not rely on the assumption that our 
beliefs may be more or less justified.  
 
Admittedly, some philosophers find high-standards skepticism to be interesting and 
worrying. As DeRose (2017) observes, the skepticism of Descartes’ First Meditation is 
actually a form of high-standards skepticism.22 Further, many contemporary epistemologists 
seem to defend high-standards skepticism, not full-blooded skepticism; I am here thinking 
of Unger (1975), Stroud (1984), Davis (2007), and BonJour (2010).23  
 
But even if we set aside the question of whether high-standards skepticism is interesting, 
threatening, or historically significant, there is a deeper problem for this view. Once we 
grant that our beliefs can be more or less justified, it becomes unclear why we should 
accept the skeptic’s claim that our ideal cognitive state is that of knowledge. Why not hold 
the following view instead: (a) there is some cognitive state indicative of “full cognitive 
success”, (b) this ideal has practical value, and yet (c) this ideal is not adequately 
characterized as knowledge? This is my second line of response to the “practical ideals 
skeptic”. I’ll elaborate below.  
 
According to BonJour, knowledge is a “supremely valuable and desirable cognitive state” 
indicative of “full cognitive success” (2010: 58). To make sense of the value of knowledge, 
BonJour maintains that knowledge requires “the highest possible degree of justification: 
justification that is conclusive, that guarantees the truth of the claim that is believed” (ibid: 
59). Why think knowledge requires infallible justification? According to BonJour, it makes 
sense to say that knowledge demands the highest level of justification because this would 
guarantee the truth of our belief, and thus our belief’s aim is achieved.24 Complete cognitive 
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success is achieved only when our justification is sufficient to establish completely that our 
belief is true.  
 
Fair enough. But is it natural or reasonable to identify the situation of such complete 
success as one of knowledge (or knowing)? BonJour seems to think so, but this claim relies 
crucially on the assumption that knowledge is “a supremely valuable and desirable cognitive 
state, one whose possession marks the difference between full cognitive success and at 
least some degree of cognitive failure: knowledge is the epistemic summum bonum” (2010: 
58). Why give knowledge this lofty status? BonJour provides the following explanation: 
skepticism is intellectually threatening because knowledge has this exalted status (ibid). But 
this seems rather weak justification in the context of the skeptical puzzle. Wouldn’t 
skepticism be more threatening if it endangered something we take ourselves to possess in 
ordinary life, not some ideal we never achieve? Thus, it is implausible to think our ordinary 
concept of knowledge is characterizing this ideal. It is more plausible to regard this cognitive 
ideal as demanding more than knowledge (or perhaps as characterizing a special form of 
knowledge).  
 
In a recent paper titled “Idealized Epistemology”, Robert Pasnau makes this point quite 
convincingly. He argues that Aristotle, Descartes, and many other historical philosophers 
were primarily interested in the study of epistemic ideals, but he also says our ordinary 
concept of knowledge does not identify this ideal epistemic state. In his discussion of 
Aristotle, for example, Pasnau says that Aristotle characterizes his subject matter as haplos 
epistêmê, which is an ideal epistemic state. Although Pasnau translates this as 
“unconditional or unqualified knowledge” (2013: 994), he directly contrasts this notion with 
“the ordinary sorts of knowledge that human beings regularly do possess” (ibid). Pasnau 
goes on to say that Aristotle and Descartes are “offering not a theory of ‘knowledge’... but 
an account of the ideal limit of human inquiry” (2013: 995, emphasis mine). In other words, 
the ideal limit of human inquiry is contrasted with knowledge.  
 
Thus, there is little reason to think our everyday concept of knowledge is used to mark out 
this idealized epistemic state. This creates a problem for the skeptic. The skeptic was 
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supposed to show that we lack knowledge. But if knowledge is not the epistemic ideal, then 
our inability to achieve this cognitive state is no threat to what we know. The skeptic may 
wish to affix the label “knowledge” to this epistemic ideal, but this would trivialize their 
view. Although no one would “know” anything, according to the skeptic’s definition, we 
would continue to know things according to the ordinary notion of knowledge. Further, we 
have a good reason not to replace the ordinary notion with the skeptic’s: it wouldn’t serve 
any practical purpose in epistemic evaluation.  
 
So far I have only considered the practical role of epistemic ideals. Perhaps there are other 
practical factors that could push us toward skepticism. From the point of view of error 
avoidance, for example, radical doubt seems optimal. But we must balance our desire to 
avoid error with the need to acquire true beliefs, and I doubt that any such epistemic policy 
would favor skeptical standards. Indeed, we would need an obsessional interest in avoiding 
error at the expense of acquiring truth. Alternatively, one might argue that infallible 
standards are instrumentally valuable because they cultivate intellectual humility and open-
mindedness. I do not have space to discuss all these possible views. While my exploration of 
the practical grounds for skepticism has not been exhaustive, I find it reasonable to 
conclude that the search for practical factors that would push us into the arms of the 
skeptic is unpromising. I doubt that practical motives could lead us to prefer imposing 
requirements that would keep out falsehoods by rejecting everything.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Can we live with the results of skepticism? If not, does this have any bearing on the truth of 
the skeptic’s view?  
 
Pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are often dismissed. Although the consequences of 
skepticism might be practically or intellectually disastrous, this fact is believed to have little, 
if any, bearing on the truth of skepticism. I have argued, however, that skepticism is 
implausible because it is impractical. More specifically, skepticism is implausible because it 
goes against the point of epistemic evaluation. When we consider epistemic evaluation in 
terms of its function, we realize that skepticism would prevent us from reasonably ending 
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our inquiries, thwart our ability to identify informants on whom we can rely for actionable 
information, render almost all of our assertions improper, and threaten to paralyze action. 
This provides us with an adequate reason to think that knowledge isn’t equipped with 
skeptical standards.  
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we would have a knowledge concept that has basically no application. Second, I reject the premise that we must be in 
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sort of reply to the skeptic. Thanks to Bryan Frances and Thomas Grundmann for raising this concern. 
24 This presupposes that truth is the aim of belief, which I will grant for the sake of argument.  
